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"Its death is a classic symptom of the problem with our 
politics; the special interest prevails over the general 
interest." 1 With this epitaph, one member of the congres 
sional conference committee summed up the fate of the im 
migration reform package that died within his committee in 
October 1984. The bill under consideration was popularly 
known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. It represented the latest 
unsuccessful effort by Congress of a quest that began in the 
early 1970s to come to grips with the nation's outmoded and 
out-of-control immigration system. 2
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill was not a panacea for the na 
tion's immigration ills. It represented only the first step of 
what eventually must be a series of legislative moves to 
assure that the immigration system contributes to the 
nation's economic welfare and does not contravene such 
goals. For although the Simpson-Mazzoli bill did contain 
other features, it primarily addressed illegal immigration. As 
important as is this issue, it is a fundamental mistake to 
assume that abuse of the existing system is the only problem 
with the nation's immigration system. To the contrary, the 
nation's immigration system is in need of a complete 
overhaul. Massive illegal immigration is only the most ob 
vious symptom that something is wrong.
It was the original intention of this paper to discuss why 
the Simpson-Mazzoli bill was only the first and not the final
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step in the immigration reform process. The defeat of this 
bill which, incidentally, the noted authority on immigra 
tion history, Oscar Handlin, has correctly called "a more 
liberal measure than any we've had in 90 years" 3 means 
that the reform movement is back to square one. Hence, it is 
not yet possible to speak only about the agenda that lies 
"beyond Simpson-Mazzoli." The whole issue of immigra 
tion reform still remains to be again addressed.
The Issue in Brief Perspective
There are only two ways for a nation to acquire its labor 
force: people are born within its boundaries or they im 
migrate from other nations. Throughout most of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, immigration was the most impor 
tant component of the nation's human resource policy. The 
imposition of the nation's first numerical ceilings on im 
migration in the 1920s was followed by several decades of 
depression, war, and their immediate aftermaths. As a con 
sequence, immigration diminished significantly in terms of 
its human resource importance from the early 1920s to the 
early 1960s. Because of this diminished role over this forty 
year period, many scholars and policymakers have been slow 
to recognize that since the mid-1960s, immigration in all of 
its diverse forms has again become a major feature of the 
U.S. economy. The 1980 Census revealed that since 1970, the 
number of foreign-born Americans had increased sharply 
after declining each previous decade since 1920 and it 
disclosed that one of every 10 people in the country reported 
speaking a language other than English at home. As there 
was a substantial statistical undercount of the illegal im 
migration population, it is certain that the dramatic findings 
of the size of the foreign-born population in 1980 are 
significantly understated. Noting the developments, Leon 
Bouvier observed in 1981 that "immigration now appears to
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be almost as important as fertility insofar as U.S. population 
growth is concerned." 4 As the labor force is the principal 
means by which population changes are transmitted to the 
nation's economy, Bouvier warned that "there is a compell 
ing argument for close co-ordination between the formula 
tion of employment and immigration policy." 5 Recognition 
of this critical linkage is the basis for the drive for immigra 
tion reform in the 1980s.
The Ability of Policy to Affect 
Labor Force Trends
The preponderance of factors that influence labor force 
trends within an economy are beyond the realm of 
policymakers to influence, even if they want to do so. Labor 
market research has repeatedly shown, for instance, that 
race and gender can influence employment and income ex 
periences of the labor force. As the number and proportion 
of minorities and women have increased in the labor force, 
there is nothing that human resource policymakers can do to 
change these trends. They can only respond with adjustment 
policies designed to influence the factors that cause these 
outcome differentials to occur. The same can be said for 
demographic changes in the age distribution of the labor 
force, the shift in social values that have contributed to the 
dramatic increase in female labor force participation, or the 
effects of the pace and scope of technological change on the 
preparation of workers for jobs. The control of immigration 
flows, however, is considered to be an exercise in the use of 
the discretionary powers of the state. As such, it is one 
dimension of a nation's human resource policy that should 
be capable of directive action rather than forced reaction.
Immigration has economic implications for the par 
ticipants and for the receiving society. It can determine labor 
force trends as well as respond to them. For this reason, the
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efficacy of policies that regulate immigration must be judged 
in terms of how they have related to broader labor force 
trends at any particular time. As will soon be apparent, this 
is decidedly not the case in the United States as of the 
mid-1980s.
The Influence of Administrative Structure
Because the magnitude and composition of immigration 
flows are supposedly subject to direct regulation by human 
institutions, it is essential to understand how the policymak- 
ing process functions. There is only tangential mention of 
immigration in the Constitution. By the late nineteenth cen 
tury, however, the Supreme Court had concluded that the 
federal government was the exclusive governmental body to 
assume this responsibility. 6 After a brief assignment of 
power to the Department of the Treasury and later to the 
Department of Commerce and Labor, the administration of 
immigration policy was shifted to the newly established U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) in 1914. This action 
represented a clear recognition by policymakers of the time 
that labor market considerations should be a primary con 
cern in the administration of immigration policy. In 1933, by 
executive order, the immigration and the naturalization 
functions (which had been separately administered in DOL) 
were joined into one agency the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). The INS has continued every 
since to be responsible for the implementation of immigra 
tion policy.
With the recognition in 1940 of the likely involvement of 
the United States in World War II, a critical decision was 
made that has had lasting influence on the course of im 
migration policy. In June 1940, the INS was shifted from 
DOL to the U.S. Department of Justice. Ostensibly, the shift 
was necessary for national security reasons. It was believed
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that rapidly changing international events dictated a more ef 
fective means of control over immigrants and nonim 
migrants. Concern over the entry and presence of subversive 
foreign elements in the population was elevated to the 
highest priority mission of the agency. Labor market con 
siderations the historic concern were shunted aside.
When the war ended, the INS remained in the Department 
of Justice. The long-run effects of this administrative change 
have been disastrous to efforts to build a coherent immigra 
tion policy especially if one of the concerns is that im 
migration policy should be congruent with domestic labor 
force trends. The Department of Justice has multiple respon 
sibilities and, when compared to its numerous other impor 
tant duties, immigration matters have tended to be neglected 
or relegated to a low order of priority. Moreover, the 
Department of Justice is one of the most politically sensitive 
agencies in the federal government. It has often opted for the 
short-run expedient solutions for immigration issues. It has 
seldom manifested any interest in the economic aspects and 
consequences of immigration.
Another lasting effect of the shift of immigration policy to 
the Justice Department has been that the two judiciary com 
mittees of Congress gained the responsibility for supervision 
over immigration in general and the INS in particular. Tradi 
tionally, membership on these committees has been reserved 
(often exclusively) for lawyers. The result, as noted by David 
North and Alien LeBel, is that "as immigration problems 
arise, be they major or minor, perceived or real, the response 
of lawyer-legislators is that the law should be changed." 7 As 
a consequence, immigration law in the United States has 
become extremely complex and legalistic. In addition to 
these laws, it is also the case that INS operations are govern 
ed by more than 5,000 pages of written rules. Over the years, 
the labor market implications of immigration policy have
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either been ignored or given only superficial attention by the 
INS.
The Nature of the Existing Immigration System
Before discussing the reform of the extant immigration 
system, it is necessary to outline briefly what is the current 
system. To do this, it is necessary to look at the major policy 
components those that pertain to legal immigration, 
refugees, asylees, and illegal immigration. For the sake of 
brevity, I am not going to discuss the complex topics of 
nonimmigrant labor policy or of border commuter labor 
policy which are also part of this system and are also in dire 
need of reform.
Legal Immigration Policy
The revival of legal immigration as an influential force can 
be virtually dated to the passage of the Immigration Act of 
1965. It represented the culmination of decades of efforts to 
purge the nation's immigration system of the overt racism 
that had been the central focus of the "national origins 
system" adopted in 1924. After years of active struggle, the 
Civil Rights movement achieved its capstone goal the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Just as overt racism 
could not longer be tolerated in the way citizens were treated 
by fellow citizens, neither could racism be practiced by the 
laws that govern the way in which noncitizens were con 
sidered for immigrant admission.
The restrictive features of the "national origins system" 
had done more than shape the racial and ethnic composition 
of immigrant flows. It had sharply distorted the total flow of 
immigrants. Some nations with large quotas (e.g., Great Bri 
tain, which was entitled to about 40 percent of all of the 
available visas) did not use all of the slots available to it while
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other nations with small quotas (e.g., Italy and Greece) had 
massive backlogs of would-be immigrants. Hence, during 
the years 1952 to 1965, for example, only 61 percent of the 
available quotas were actually used, despite the fact that tens 
of thousands of persons were precluded from admission 
because they came from the "wrong" country. Succeeding 
administrations in the post-World War II era were forced, 
therefore, to seek ad hoc legislation and to use parole powers 
given to the Attorney General to admit hundreds of 
thousands of refugees for both humanitarian and national 
interest considerations. As a consequence, one of every three 
persons admitted to the United States from 1952 to 1965 
entered outside the terms of the prevailing immigration 
system. Hence, because the system was outdated by the pro 
gression of both world and domestic events, the Immigration 
Act of 1965 was adopted.
It is important to note that while the changes enacted in 
1965 significantly altered the character of the existing 
system, the reform movement could not entirely escape the 
heavy hand of the past. Thus, while overt racism was 
eliminated in 1965, the new act elevated family reunification 
to the role of being the dominant admission factor. On the 
surface this might seem to be a humane feature, but the 
motivation for the change was far less noble. The change was 
made in the judiciary committee of the House of Represen 
tatives where some congressional supporters were more con 
cerned with finding a way to retain the national origins 
system under a covert guise. Obviously, if certain groups had 
been excluded or had a low quota in the past, they would 
have had fewer chances to have relatives who could use their 
presence as a means to admit new immigrants. Thus, reliance 
on family unification would largely benefit those groups who 
had large quotas under the older system. The Johnson ad 
ministration opposed this move. It sought to retain both the 
priority and the emphasis of labor market considerations as
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the highest preference criterion (which had been the case 
since the use of a preference system to determine immigrant 
priorities was formally established in 1952). Congress, 
however, made family reunification the dominant admission 
factor. The Johnson administration was forced to accept the 
change as the price of getting rid of the national origins ad 
mission system. Labor market considerations were 
downgraded to both lower preferences and to a sharply 
reduced number of visa allotments. The ostensible reasons 
for the reversal or priorities was that during the era when 
labor market factors dominated, the system had not used all 
of the available slots. But as already noted, the reason for 
the inability to use all of the available slots between 1952-65 
was the distortion imposed by the "national origins 
system" not the concept of labor force priority itself.
In the years since 1965, there have been a number of minor 
changes in the immigration system but they have retained 
this focus on family reunification. The system as of early 
1984 sets a single worldwide admission ceiling of 270,000 
visas to be issued each year. No more than 20,000 visas are to 
be allotted to the would-be immigrants of any one country. 
The "immediate relatives" of each visa holder, however, are 
not counted in either ceiling. Immediate relatives are 
spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens over age 21. 
To decide which specific individuals are to be granted such a 
visa within the framework of these numerical ceilings, a six- 
category preference system exists. The categories rank the 
preferences in order with a certain proportion of the total 
visas reserved for each preference. Four of the categories 
(which account for 80 percent of the visas) are reserved for 
persons who are family-related. Thus, family reunification 
has, since 1965, become the mainstay of the legal immigra 
tion system. The two remaining admission categories are 
based on labor market principles. They account for the re 
maining 20 percent of the available visas each year. For these
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two labor market categories, a person must secure a cer 
tification from the Department of Labor that states that the 
presence of the immigrant will not adversely affect the job 
opportunities and prevailing labor force standards of citizen 
workers. In addition to the preference categories, Congress 
has established 33 separate classes of people who are 
specifically excluded from being admitted (e.g., paupers, 
prostitutes, Nazis, communists, fascists, homosexuals, etc.) 
no matter if they would otherwise be eligible to be an im 
migrant.
It should also be noted that between 1965 and 1980, a 
separate preference group existed for refugees with 17,400 
slots. Over that interval, however, the actual number of 
refugee admissions greatly exceeded this ceiling. (Excluding 
Vietnamese refugees, it averaged about 50,000 persons a 
year.) The excesses were admitted through the use of the 
parole authority given to the Attorney General to admit per 
sons for "emergent reasons." Because the use of the parole 
powers was finally admitted to be what it was a means of 
circumventing the existing immigration statutes, refugees 
were removed from the established immigration system in 
1980. With the Refugee Act of 1980, they are admitted under 
a separate procedure. Since 1982, the President arbitrarily 
sets the number of refugees to be admitted in advance of 
each fiscal year. He then must consult with Congress over 
the appropriateness of the suggested figure. The number of 
refugees approved for 1984, for instance, was 72,000 per 
sons. Obviously, there are no labor market considerations 
applied to the entry eligibility of refugees.
The Refugee Act of 1980 also created an asylee policy for 
the United States. As opposed to a refugee (who is a person 
living outside of his or her home nation and who fears 
persecution if forced to return but who is not presently in the 
United States), an asylee is a person who also fears similar
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persecution if he or she returns to his or her homeland but is 
already physically present in the United States. The Refugee 
Act of 1980 authorized up to 5,000 asylee admissions a year. 
As of early 1984, there were over 173,000 asylee requests 
pending approval and it is likely that this number will con 
tinue to grow. As with refugees, there are no labor market 
considerations applied to asylees.
Having discussed the "front door" approaches to the na 
tions labor market, it is necessary to add that there is a 
massive "back door" approach as well. Although the legal 
system is extremely complex in its objectives, the entire 
system can be easily circumvented by those who enter illegal 
ly. Unlike most other nations, there are no penalties on 
employers who hire illegal immigrants in the United States. 
Virtually all illegal immigrants who are caught are given a 
"voluntary departure" back to their homeland. Hence, there 
is virtually no deterrence associated with the violation of the 
existing system. There is no system of work permits or of na 
tional identification and those forms of identification that 
are available are easily counterfeitable. Moreover, the INS 
has always been chronically understaffed and underfunded 
relative to the duties it is assigned.
All evidence indicates that most illegal immigrants come to 
the United States to find jobs not for purposes of securing 
welfare or for criminal purposes. No one, of course, knows 
the exact number of illegal immigrants who compose the 
stock of the illegal immigrant population or the annual flow. 
In its final report in 1981, the Select Commission on Im 
migration and Refugee Policy cited a range of from 3.5 to 6 
million illegal immigrants. Their estimate, however, was bas 
ed upon a review provided by the Census Bureau of a variety 
of previous studies done in the early and mid-1970s. Thus, 
whatever the validity of the estimate included in the Select 
Commission's report, it should be understood that it was
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based on the averaging of data for the mid-1970s not the 
mid-1980s. Given the certainty that illegal immigration has 
increased since the mid-1970s, the stock and flows are no 
doubt greater now than those cited by the Commission's 
Report. In 1984, the INS apprehended 1,056,905 illegal im 
migrants. Many of these people were apprehended more 
than once. On the other hand, however, most illegal im 
migrants especially those from countries other than Mex 
ico are never caught. Hence, the magnitude of the stock 
and annual flows of illegal immigrants cannot be estimated 
with any degree of accuracy.
Labor Market Impacts of the Era 
of Renewed Immigration
There is a paucity of credible research on the precise 
employment experiences of all groups of post-1965 im 
migrants. There is no statistical data base to measure the 
labor force status of immigrants comparable to the informa 
tion compiled by the monthly Current Population Survey for 
all workers in the United States. All that are available are ad 
ministrative statistics the findings of a few ad hoc studies 
of immigrants, and information on the foreign-born popula 
tion supplied by the decennial census count. From these 
disparate sources, however, it is possible to discern some 
likely tendencies. An awareness of these tendencies and their 
logical conclusions is prerequisite to an understanding of the 
macro-economic effects of immigrantion to the nation.
The Immigrant Infusion to the Supply 
of Labor Has Increased
The annual flow of legal immigrants since 1965 has more 
than doubled the annual flow that existed for the period 1924 
to 1965. For the earlier period, the annual flow was 191,000 
immigrants and immediate relatives; for the period 1965 to
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1981, the number has increased to an annual average of 
435,000; for the years 1978 to 1981, it was 547,000. These 
figures do not include those refugees who have yet to adjust 
their status to become resident aliens, or those asylees whose 
status is still pending, or any illegal immigrants. If all flows 
are considered, it is likely that immigration in the 1980s is ac 
counting for as much as half of the annual growth in the 
population and probably an even greater percentage of the 
real growth of the labor force. 8
The Size of the Annual Flow of Immigrants Has No Regard 
for Domestic Labor Market Conditions
The aggregate number of immigrants and immediate 
relatives admitted each year is completely independent of the 
prevailing labor market conditions. The number of im 
migrants annually admitted has in no way been influenced by 
the tightness or looseness of the domestic labor market. If 
allowance is also made for refugees admitted since 1965 and 
for the tide of illegal immigrants that have entered over this 
same period, immigration has steadily added substantial 
numbers of additional workers, regardless of the cyclical 
ability of the economy to provide sufficient jobs for citizen 
or immigrant workers. This practice is at total variance with 
the practice of most of the handful of other countries that 
have been admitting immigrants over this same period.
Immigrants Have a Higher 
Labor Force Participation Rate
The few studies that have focused upon labor force par 
ticipation of immigrants reveal that the majority of im 
migrants over age 16 do enter the labor force. Indeed, they 
show that the actual labor force participation rate for legal 
immigrants and their immediate relative is likely to be con 
siderably not marginally higher than that of the general 
population. 9
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There is no such data, of course, for illegal immigrants but 
it is intuitively obvious that their labor force participation 
rates are higher than those of legal immigrants. Illegal im 
migrants are primarily job seekers. They are legislatively in 
eligible for many of the transfer programs that might pro 
vide alternative income sources. The case with refugees, 
however, is not quite so clear. Refugees prior to the 1970s 
seem to have had a relatively easier adjustment process to 
labor force entry than have large infusions of refugees from 
Southeast Asia that have occurred since the mid-1970s. 
Refugees have been eligible not only for federal income 
transfer programs but also for local and state programs that 
are available to citizens.
Immigration Supplies Workers Independent of the 
Macro Human Resource Needs of the Economy
An overwhelming proportion of those persons who have 
immigrated to the United States have been admitted without 
regard to their skill, education, or geographic settlement 
preferences. As noted earlier, 80 percent of the persons who 
receive visas to immigrate are admitted because the immigra 
tion system gives preference to family reunification prin 
ciples. Immediate relatives of all immigrants are admitted 
regardless of their labor force credentials, as are all refugees 
and all would-be asylees. This is not meant to imply that 
those who are admitted under these procedures lack talents 
but rather, as David North and Alien LeBel have observed, 
they "do so accidently." 10 Accordingly it is estimated that 
only about 5 percent of all those persons admitted to the 
United States each year are required to have labor certifica 
tions that indicate they are filling established labor force 
needs. If illegal immigrants are included, of course, this 
small percentage of certified workers would be reduced to an 
infinitesimal number compared to the total flow of im 
migrant workers.
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The Immigrant Flow is Predominately Composed 
of Members of Minority Groups
The most important qualitative change in the personal 
characteristics of immigrants that has occurred since the end 
of the national origins system has been the complete shift in 
the regions of origin of the immigrants. Almost 80 percent of 
the immigrants and refugees admitted during the 1970s were 
from Latin America and Asia. In the 1980s, the percentage is 
even higher (close to 84 percent). Beginning with the decade 
of the 1960s, Europe was replaced for the first time in the na 
tion's history by Latin America as the leading source of im 
migrants. By the 1970s, Asia which was not free from the 
discriminatory features of the previous immigration system, 
was challenging Latin America for that distinction.
The last time that a European nation was among the top 
five of the countries that supply immigrants to the United 
States was in 1973 (when Italy placed fifth). Mexico has 
become the country that annually supplies the most im 
migrants; the Philippine Islands have tended to be the 
runner-up. The other sources vary from year to year but, 
since 1974, they have all been located in either Asia or the 
Caribbean area.
The predominance of immigrants from Latin America and 
the Caribbean area can be easily explained in terms of the 
priority given to family reunification in the admissions 
system. For Asians, the explanation is more complex. It 
would seem that the family reunification system should have 
worked against many Asian groups, given the exclusionary 
features that were in effect for much of the pre-1965 era. The 
answer to this paradox is the fact that Asians have made 
astute use of the occupational preferences as well as the fact 
that they have overwhelmingly dominated the massive 
refugee flows for each year since the mid-1970s. In the first 
case, the Asian immigrants have tended to be skilled and
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highly educated; in the latter instance, they have usually been 
unskilled and poorly educated.
Likewise, the illegal immigrant flows have also come 
predominately from Mexico and the Caribbean area. The 
best approximations are that about 60 percent of the illegal 
immigrants to the United States come from Mexico and 
about 20 percent come from other countries of the Carib 
bean area. The remaining 20 percent come from other na 
tions of the world.
Without doubt, therefore, the combined immigrant flows 
are overwhelmingly composed of persons from minority 
groups (Hispanics, blacks, and Asians). As will be discussed 
later, there is a strong clustering pattern of these immigrants 
into local labor markets of the central cities of a few large 
states that are already composed of persons from similar 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. As a result, it is very likely 
that many immigrants compete directly with other citizen 
minority workers for available jobs. The competition is most 
likely to be most adverse in the lower skilled occupations. 
For the higher skilled legal immigrants, the competition for 
employment opportunities is more broadly based and, 
accordingly, the impact is less severe.
It is likely, therefore, that since 1965, immigration in 
general but illegal immigration and refugee flows in par 
ticular has tended to adversely affect the employment, 
unemployment and labor force participation rates of minori 
ty citizens. The geographical concentration of immigrants in 
a few large metropolitan areas has also tended to moderate 
wage increases for all workers who compete with them in 
these same labor markets in general but with minority group 
citizens in particular.'' To the degree this has happened, un 
controlled immigration has worked at cross purposes with 
other federal human resource policies that have been in 
itiated over these same years that have been designed prin-
58 Immigration Reform
cipally to improve the economic opportunity for these same 
minority citizen groups.
The Occupational Patterns of Immigrants Differ 
Extensively From Those of the Labor Force as a Whole
With specific reference to the occupational patterns of im 
migrants, the occupational distribution of those admitted as 
legal immigrants is skewed toward professional, technical, 
and skilled workers. The pattern is due largely to the fact 
that the complex admission system is biased toward those 
who have family connections as well as the time and the 
money that it takes to work their way through the labyrinth 
of the legal immigration system. For the minority who are 
admitted under the two occupational preferences and who, 
by virtual definition do not have family relatives who are 
citizens, the two occupational preferences generally favor 
those with high skills and extensive educational 
backgrounds. Persons who are likely to become "public 
charges," for instance, are specifically excluded from 
becoming legal immigrants. Furthermore, because of the ex 
tensive backlog of visa applications (over 1.2 million visa ap 
plications were pending at the end of 1982), there have been 
no visas available since 1978 for the nonpreference "catch 
all" category that theoretically exists. Thus, it is not surpris 
ing that the occupational characteristics are skewed dif 
ferently from the distribution of the labor force as a whole.
It appears from studies by David North of a cohort of 
1970 immigrants and a study by Barry Chiswick of the 
foreign-born who entered the U.S. up to 1970, that the earn 
ings of immigrants tend to be initially below those of citizen 
workers in comparable occupations but that these dif 
ferences gradually vanish in 11 to 15 years. 12 Chiswick, in 
fact, found that male immigrants actually end up doing bet 
ter than citizen workers in comparable occupations after
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about 20 years in the country. He was unable to make con 
clusive findings about female immigrants. It is of conse 
quence to note that Chiswick found that immigrants from 
Mexico and the Philippines (the two countries that have been 
the largest sources of legal immigrants since 1962) took a 
longer time to sustain these results.
In reviewing, Chiswick's ambitious research on this sub 
ject, it is vital to keep in mind that his analysis is of all 
foreign-born who had entered the United States prior to 
1970. It has been after 1970, however, that the full effects of 
the Immigration Act of 1965 and the Refugee Act of 1980 
have occurred. As North has noted, the 1970 Census data on 
the foreign-born "is a group composed of persons of above 
average age, most of whom came to the U.S. many years 
earlier and under provisions of earlier legislation." 13 As a 
consequence he warns about the use of this data as a 
reference group since "one must not assume that the profile 
of the foreign-born which emerged from the 1970 Census 
will be similar to that emerging from the 1980 or 1990 Cen 
suses.'
Likewise, the sizeable increases in the number of illegal 
immigrants since the 1960s especially those from Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin have been dominated by low- 
skilled and unskilled workers, which also challenges any 
complacent deductions that would seem to be the logical 
conclusions of some of the existing literature. In Chiswick's 
work, for instance, there is no way to separate the experience 
of legal immigrants from illegal immigrants since he is study 
ing the foreign-born as reported by the Census. It is certain 
that the illegal immigrant population is severely under- 
counted in the Census and, accordingly, it is likely that their 
experiences are not adequately captured by this data base.
One study that has made use of the 1980 Census and its 
data on the foreign-born, done by Gregory DeFreitas and
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Adriana Marshall found that over one-third of all im 
migrants were employed in manufacturing (compared to 23 
percent of native-born workers). 15 In many metropolitan 
areas, the concentration was more severe 75 percent of all 
manufacturing workers in Miami were immigrants; over 40 
percent of those in Los Angeles and New York City; 25 per 
cent in San Francisco; and 20 percent in Chicago and 
Boston. In 35 metropolitan areas with a population of one 
million or more, immigrants comprised 19 percent of all pro 
duction jobs in manufacturing. Not surprisingly, given the 
occupational, industrial and geographic concentration of the 
immigrant work force, the study found that the rate of wage 
growth in manufacturing was inversely related to the size of 
the immigrant population in those metropolitan areas. The 
high concentration of foreign-born workers had a statistical 
ly significant negative impact on wage growth compared to 
the experience with large metropolitan areas with lower 
percentages of foreign-born workers.
Given that the illegal immigrant flows into the labor force 
since 1965 are likely to have matched and probably exceeded 
the legal flows, it is essential that the labor market ex 
periences of illegal immigrants be specifically included in any 
effort to assess the overall impact of immigrants on the labor 
market. There are only two studies that have been able to 
make a serious attempt to capture some measure of these 
patterns. One was a nationwide study made of apprehended 
illegal immigrants by David North and Marion Houstoun in 
1976. 16 The second was a study made of unapprehended il 
legal immigrants in Los Angeles in 1979 by a research team 
from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). 17 
Both studies were funded by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
In the North and Houstoun study, the respondents had been 
in the United States for an average of 2.5 years while in the 
UCLA study the mean was 4.0 years.
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The occupational patterns of the respondents in the two 
studies showed conclusively that illegal immigrants are con 
centrated in the unskilled occupations of farm workers, ser 
vice workers, nonfarm laborers as well as the semi-skilled 
blue-collar occupations of operatives. A significant number 
are also in the skilled blue-collar occupation of craft 
workers. Very few were found in any white-collar occupa 
tion.
A comparison of the data from these two studies shows 
that the occupational patterns of illegal immigrants closely 
resembles those of Mexican Americans (Chicanos) and of 
blacks. The employment pattern of Chicanos, in fact, better 
resembles the pattern of illegal immigrants than it does the 
general distribution pattern of the overall labor force.
It seems certain that the illegal immigrant workers are con 
centrated in the secondary labor market of the U.S. economy 
where they often compete with the millions of citizen 
workers who also are working and seek work in this sector. 
Indeed, Malcolm Lovell, the Under Secretary of Labor, in 
his testimony to Congress in support of immigration reform, 
stated that "in 1981, close to 30 percent of all workers 
employed in this country, some 29 million people, were 
holding down the same kind of low-skilled industrial, ser 
vice, and farm jobs in which illegals typically find employ 
ment." 18
Illegal immigrants are by no means the only cause of 
unemployment and persistent low income patterns among 
certain subgroups of the American labor force but they cer 
tainly are one factor. The formulation of any serious full 
employment strategy for the United States in the 1980s, 
therefore, will have to include measures to curtail illegal im 
migration.
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Thus, it would appear that the occupational impact of 
legal immigrants is at the upper end of the nation's occupa 
tional structure while the impact of illegal immigrants is at 
the lower end. Studies that combine these two groups to ob 
tain an average measure of the experience of immigrants on 
the labor force miss the actual significance of the real im 
pact.
The Locational Impact of Immigrants 
is Extremely Unequal
One of the most pronounced effects of the unguided im 
migration system is that legal immigrants are highly concen 
trated into a relatively few major labor markets. Since 1966, 
California and New York have consistently accounted for 
almost half of the intended residences of all legal im 
migrants. Texas, Florida, New Jersey and Illinois account 
for about one-quarter of the intended settlement destina 
tions. Thus, six states have received almost three-quarters of 
all of the legal immigrants. Data from the 1980 Census also 
confirm this high concentration rate of the total foreign- 
born population in these same states (the percentage of 
foreign-born in California was 14.8 percent, New York 13.4 
percent, New Jersey 10.3, Florida 10.9, Illinois 7.3 and 
Texas 6.0; the only other state with a large foreign-born 
population was Hawaii with 14.0 percent). 19
Within the states in which they settle, legal immigrants 
have demonstrated a consistent preference in the 1970s for 
the large central cities. 20 Although the exact percentage 
varies each year, a central city was the destination of about 
55 percent of the immigrants who were admitted between 
1960 and 1979. Urban areas those with a population of be 
tween 2,500 to 99,000 people were the clear second choices 
while rural areas were a distant last. These initial residential 
patterns differ distinctly from those of the general popula-
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tion in which urban areas have become the overwhelming 
first choice since 1960 (accounting for almost half of the 
population) followed by an almost equal preference (of 
about 25 percent each) for central cities and rural areas.
The 1980 Census information on the foreign-born popula 
tion vividly demonstrates the effect that immigration is hav 
ing on the population of a few large metropolitan areas. In 
1980, for instance, the metropolitan area with the highest 
percentage of its population being foreign-born was Miami, 
with a phenomenal percentage of 35.2 percent. The second 
highest was Los Angeles (21.6 percent) and the third was 
New York City (20.8 percent). Thus, the necessity to accom 
modate the growing immigrant flow has not fallen evenly. 
Only a few states and a handful of cities have borne the 
brunt of the revival of immigration that has occurred since 
1965. As the aforementioned DeFreitas and Marshall study 
found, one effect of the disproportionate concentrations has 
been to retard wage growth in these large metropolitan areas 
relative to other metropolitan areas with fewer immigrant 
workers. It is also of consequence to note that the settlement 
pattern of illegal immigrants has closely resembled the loca- 
tional preferences of legal immigrants. In their quest to 
avoid detection, illegal immigrants often seek to blend into 
communities that already have large numbers of persons 
from similar ethnic backgrounds. This tendency, of course, 
only intensifies the pressures on these few states and cities to 
accommodate immigrants.
Thus, the uneven distribution of immigrants means that 
studies that focus on the national or state level miss the ac 
tual impact of immigration at the local level in the com 
munities of only a handful of states. But when one 
recognizes that those central cities in these few states account 
for a significant portion of the total employment in the na 
tion, there is no reason to consider these impacts as inconse 
quential to the economy as a whole.
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In the Short Run, It is Likely that Immigrants 
Contribute to Higher Unemployment Rates
Chiswick has found for the foreign-born males that it 
takes about five years for them to reach the same number of 
weeks worked and to come down to the same number of 
weeks of unemployment as native-born men. 21 This would 
suggest that in the short run that immigrant males tend to ex 
perience a higher incidence of unemployment than is the 
general case. In his findings, it is also of importance to note 
that he also found that the foreign-born males from Mexico, 
Cuba, and China tended to take longer to reach parity with 
native-born men than it did the foreign-born men from other 
nations. All three of these countries have consistently ranked 
among the largest sources of legal immigrants and refugees 
since 1970. It is logical to conclude that, if anything, the 
unemployment experiences of the past decade should be less 
favorable than those that occurred prior to the 1970s.
Concluding Observations
The prevailing immigration policy of the United States 
was largely conceived in the early 1950s and the mid-1960s 
when immigration was not a particularly significant in 
fluence on the economy of the nation. As a consequence, the 
current immigration policy manifests a complete disinterest 
in its labor force implications. Perhaps the nation could con 
tinue to allow immigration policy to be excluded from any 
responsibility to contribute directly to the nation's economic 
welfare if the economy had not undergone significant 
changes and if the immigration flows of workers had remain 
ed relatively small. But this has not been the case. Hence, the 
"practice" of allowing immigration policy to continue to 
follow its own nepotistic, inflexible, mechanistic, and 
massively abused course is a "luxury" that this nation can ill 
afford to continue.
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The contemporary economy of the United States is a far 
cry from the one into which earlier waves of immigrants 
entered. The resurgence of immigration since 1965 has exact 
ly parallelled the period when the labor force of the United 
States has sustained unprecedented changes in both size and 
composition.
With regard to size, the civilian labor force increased by an 
average of 1.8 million workers each year from 1964 to 1973; 
and annually by 2.2 million from 1973 to 1980. Since then 
the rate of annual increase as officially measured (which 
means that it is doubtful if the full effects of growing 
numbers of illegal immigrants are included) has declined 
slightly. Nonetheless, in 1984 the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) announced that it is revising its long term projections 
of labor force growth from the period 1982 to 1990 to 1.6 
million net new workers each year. (I would argue that even 
this projection is conservative as all past projections by the 
BLS have been.)
As for the composition of the labor force, the period since 
1965 has been one in which racial and ethnic groups as well 
as women have dramatically increased their proportions of 
the total labor force. The BLS projects that these patterns 
will continue with women accounting for two-thirds of the 
annual growth in the labor force and blacks about 25 percent 
over the next decade. It is certain especially if immigration 
continues the pattern of the past that the Hispanic labor 
force will also increase its share disproportionately even 
though the BLS did not highlight this group in its projec 
tions.
With respect to the entire labor force, the next decade 
presents the nation with a unique situation. Because the 
"baby boom" generation has now come of age, it is pro 
jected that by 1990 the largest single age cohort of the 
population will be between the ages of 25 to 44 the prime
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working age years. It is a period when labor force participa 
tion is at its highest for both males and females. During the 
late 1980s and early 1990s it is predicted that the majority (or 
more than half) of the total population of the U.S. will be 
participating in the labor force. By 1995, it is expected that 
70 percent of the labor force will be between 25 and 54 years 
of age. Thus, it is going to be a period in which there will be 
mounting pressure on the economy to generate additional 
employment opportunities especially for women and 
minorities. 22
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the last two 
decades of the twentieth century are going to be years in 
which the labor force of the nation will be confronted with 
immense pressures to accommodate both the growth in the 
number of job seekers as well as to changes in the composi 
tion of the supply of labor. The quest to meet these 
challenges will be difficult enough without being undermined 
by an immigration policy that is seemingly oblivious to its 
labor market impacts but which, in actuality, has influential 
labor market consequences.
The broad outlines of the policy reform needed to make 
immigration policy conform to the economic welfare of the 
nation are easy to list. With respect to the annual levels of 
immigration, there need to be enforceable ceilings. But they 
should be ceilings and not established and inflexible 
numbers. The actual number of immigrants admitted each 
year should be responsive to unemployment trends in the na 
tion. Annual immigration levels should fluctuate inversely 
with unemployment trends (as is the practice in Canada). 
The system should be capable of responding to changing 
economic circumstances. The boundary ceiling should be set 
by legislation but the precise levels in any given year should 
be set administratively. It is implicit, if this were to be done, 
that the administrative responsibilities for immigration
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policy should be shifted back to the U.S. Department of 
Labor (or some other new agency that might be created to 
administer and coordinate all of the nation's human resource 
development policies) and away from the U.S. Department 
of Justice and the judiciary committees of Congress.
In regard to the actual determination of who is admitted as 
a legal immigrant each year, the preference system should 
revert back to the primary emphasis on occupational 
preferences that characterized the system from 1952 to 1965. 
Family reunification should remain an admission criterion 
but not the primary factor, as has been the case since 1965. 
No other nation in the world allows such a nepotistic and 
discriminatory doctrine to dominate its admission system. 
The occupational preferences should be increased to at least 
the pre-1965 level of 50 percent of the available visas. Full 
discretion should be given to the administrative agency to 
decide which occupations (skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled) 
are in greatest need at any particular time and to admit them. 
Included within this discretionary power should be the right 
to give preference to immigrants willing to settle in regions 
where labor is scarce. The shift away from the dominance of 
family reunification would also allow opportunities for 
"new seed immigrants" (especially for immigrants from 
Africa, who have the most trouble competing under the ex 
isting system) to enter.
The refugee and asylee policies of the nation are the most 
difficult to integrate into a policy design that focuses on 
economic priorities. Obviously, the United States should 
continue to participate in the worldwide effort to absorb and 
to assist in the accommodation of refugees. But experience 
clearly indicates that there must be some limitations on the 
number of refugees that are to be admitted and where they 
are to be settled. A legislative ceiling should be set on the 
number of refugees to be admitted with the understanding
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that, if special circumstances do arise, more refugees may be 
admitted but that offsetting reductions will be made in the 
number of legal immigrants in the same or the following 
year. If a situation should develop that was truly extraor 
dinary, Congress could legislate a temporary increase in the 
numerical boundaries to accommodate such a unique cir 
cumstance. The asylee issue is presently too complex to 
discuss in this paper except to note that the current policy is 
hopelessly bogged down in a system of judicial paralysis. 
Currently, asylees are entitled to almost twice as many levels 
of appeals of their status as are provided to convicted 
murderers. It is essential that a more expedited system of 
reaching closure in these cases be designed. But the ultimate 
principle for admission should be the same as refugees: 
namely, if asylees permissions are granted, legal immigration 
should be reduced accordingly. It is essential that the princi 
ple of choice be firmly established in the operation of the na 
tion's immigration system. Otherwise, one is confronted 
with the chaos of the present system where the policy is 
essentially one that ratifies what has already happened 
anyway. Moreover, there is no sense establishing the concept 
that total immigrant flows should fluctuate with domestic 
labor market conditions if the entire process can be cir 
cumvented by flows from another source. There are already 
some signs that the refugee and asylee system is being used 
for purposes (such as economic betterment) other than those 
for which it was designed (i.e., to avoid persecution for one's 
political and personal views). 23 The full cost of assisting 
refugees and asylees to be prepared for entry into the labor 
market should be borne by the federal government and not 
by local communities.
All of the preceding suggestions, of course, are predicated 
on the assumption that a full-scale effort will be mounted to 
end the flow of illegal immigrants into the country. It would 
make no sense at all to attempt to construct a positive im-
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migration policy that works in tandem with general 
economic policy if the entire process can be easily cir 
cumvented. The appropriate policies should be designed to 
address both the "push" and the "pull" factors that con 
tribute to the illegal immigration process. They should in 
clude enhanced deterrent policies (e.g., employer sanctions, 
enhanced INS funding, and less reliance on the use of the 
voluntary departure system) as well as prevention measures 
(e.g., extensive economic and technical development 
assistance, trade and tariff concessions, and the absolute in 
sistence on the adherence to human rights principles and the 
protection of human life from murder and torture as a prere 
quisite for receipt of the economic aid and trade 
concessions).
The absence of any serious effort to forge an immigration 
policy based upon labor market considerations means that 
immigration policy today functions as a "wild card" among 
the nation's array of key labor market policies. Unlike all 
other elements of economic policy (e.g., fiscal policy, 
monetary policy, employment and training policy, education 
policy, and antidiscrimination policy) where attempts are 
made by policymakers to orchestrate the diverse policy 
elements into a harmony of action to accomplish particular 
objectives, immigration policy has been allowed to meander 
aimlessly. This is a situation that no sensible nation can 
allow to continue.
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